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Economic development implies that the efficiency of firms in developing countries is approaching 
that of firms in advanced economies.  We examine the extent of this convergence among all firms 
as well as a subset of firms near the efficiency frontier in two economies that represent alternative 
models of implementing market-oriented development policies: the Czech Republic and Russia.  
Using 1992-2000 panel data on virtually all medium and large industrial firms in each country, we 
find that privatization to foreign owners markedly improved the efficiency of firms, whereas 
privatization to domestic owners did not; domestic firms are not catching up to the (world) 
efficiency standard given by foreign-owned firms. This is due in part to the lower efficiency of 
domestic startups relative to foreign startups and slower “learning” by domestic firms over time as 
they converge to a lower level of efficiency.  However, foreigners’ acquisitions of more efficient 
domestic firms are also contributing to the gap.  Domestic firms closer to the frontier are not more 
likely to catch up than firms further from the frontier although foreign firms do exhibit this 
behavior. The distance of the Russian firms to the efficiency frontier is much larger than that of the 
Czech firms.  Nevertheless, after nearly a decade of reforms, neither model of development has 
resulted in convergence of domestic firms to the world standard.  
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1. Introduction 
Economic development is often viewed as a process through which living standards in poor 
countries converge to those of the rich countries.1 A necessary condition for this convergence is that 
the efficiency of firms in developing countries starts approaching the efficiency of firms in 
advanced economies.  The need for efficiency improvement in developing countries becomes 
especially relevant as globalization proceeds and greater openness to commodity and factor flows 
induces more intense worldwide competition.  The development policies pursued over the last three 
decades by many governments intended to increase efficiency in developing countries and reduce 
the gap between the poor and rich economies by pursuing a number of market oriented reforms, 
including privatization of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), stimulating the entry of new firms, and 
encouraging foreign direct investment (FDI) and trade. Given the depth and breadth of initial 
distortions and extent of subsequent reforms in the transition economies, one may expect the 
positive effects of globalization and market-oriented policies to be larger and more detectable in 
these countries than in other developing economies.  In this paper we examine whether these 
policies have propelled domestic firms in transition economies to converge to the world standard. 
The implementation of market-oriented development policies in the transition economies 
have been subject to extensive debate.  One group of critics argues that these policies have not 
contributed to the convergence process and that excessively rapid privatization and other measures 
account for the relatively poor performance of the former Soviet bloc countries in the early 
transition (e.g., Stiglitz, 1999).  Others proclaim that the problems of the less successful transition 
economies have been brought about by insufficiently rapid and comprehensive policies (e.g., Sachs, 
1996).  A nuanced view maintains that an increase in competition encourages innovative behavior 
of firms and countries that are near the efficiency frontier but stifles those that lag significantly 
behind (e.g., Aghion et al., 2002 and 2003; Acemoglu, Aghion, and Zilibotti, 2002 and 2003).2  
Finally, a model by Monge-Naranjo (2002) proposes that in the short-run FDI reduces the efficiency 
                                                 
1 This “convergence” view in development economics dates at least as far back as W. Arthur Lewis (1955). 
2 Interestingly, over two decades ago the converse of this hypothesis was proposed by Findlay (1978, p. 2) who posits 
that “the rate of technological progress in relatively ‘backward’ region is an increasing function of the gap between its 
own level of technology and that of the ‘advanced’ region which improves at a constant rate, and the degree to which it 
is open to direct foreign investment.”  See Kosova (2004) for a review. 
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of domestic firms and increases the dispersion of their efficiency, but in the long run domestic firms 
catch up with firms in the developed world. 
At the micro level, there is a growing literature questioning whether firms privatized to 
domestic owners have become more productive than SOEs and whether foreign ownership 
improves efficiency in the emerging market economies.  The evidence from numerous studies has 
shown that firms with foreign ownership are more productive than domestic firms in all parts of the 
world.3  However, the evidence on the performance effects of privatization is mixed, ranging from 
those that find no or limited systematic effect (e.g., Bevan, Estrin, and Schaffer, 1999; Hanousek, 
Kocenda, and Svejnar, 2007), to those that cautiously conclude that privatization improves firm 
performance (Megginson and Netter, 2001), to those being confident that privatization improves 
performance (Djankov and Murrell, 2002; Shirley and Walsh, 2000).4   
We examine the evolution of efficiency of industrial firms in two alternative prototypes of 
transition economies – the Czech Republic and Russia.  The two countries constitute useful case 
studies because they maintained central planning and virtually no private ownership and FDI 
inflows until the start of the transition, both rapidly privatized most state assets, and yet they 
otherwise pursued very different paths in opening the economies to market forces.5  The Czech 
Republic represents the Central and East European (CEE) model, which emphasizes the opening up 
to trade and capital flows, developing a functioning market economy and establishing institutions, 
rules and regulations that make a country eligible for accession to the European Union.  Russia is a 
model of the countries in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), which have remained 
more closed to world trade and FDI, and have changed their laws, regulations and institutions more 
slowly and without harmonizing them with those of the European Union.6  Unlike earlier studies, 
                                                 
3 See e.g., Caves (1974) for one of the first papers in this literature; Terrell and Svejnar, 1989 for evidence in Senegal; 
Aitken and Harrison, 1999 for evidence in Venezuela; and Djankov et al., 2002 for evidence in transition economies. 
4 See Roland (2000) for a theoretical analysis and overview of privatization in transition. 
5 See Ericson (1991) for a description of an intact Soviet model.  Many other transition economies do not represent 
equally clear-cut shifts of regime.  Hungary and Poland for instance introduced important reforms already under 
communism and hence operated with less tight central planning, significant private ownership and FDI. 
6 For example, in 1997 the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey carried out by the World Bank 
and the EBRD (1999, 2002) found that 40.1% of the sample in the Czech Republic, as compared to only 20.8% in 
Russia believed that the legal system would uphold contract and property rights. 
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we have data for a relatively long period (nine years) after the start of the reforms and can hence 
explore issues and perform tests that could not be carried out in other studies. 
We use the efficiency of foreign-owned firms in each country as the benchmark for the 
world standard.  This choice reflects the finding by Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004) that it is the 
most efficient firms in advanced economies that engage in FDI. By the mid-1990s foreign-owned 
firms were well established in all the major sectors of the two economies and it is therefore 
plausible that the best ones were operating at the norm.7  Moreover, using the performance of 
foreign-owned firms in each country as a proxy for the world efficiency standard is superior to 
using the performance of firms operating in advanced market economies since the latter approach is 
plagued by problems related to different institutions and shocks in the advanced vs. transition 
economies, as well as by problems related to carrying out comparisons in the presence of wide 
exchange rate fluctuations and other cross-country conversion issues. 
The performance of domestic firms in emerging markets may lag behind that of foreign 
firms for a number of reasons, including lower efficiency in generating output from inputs, inability 
to charge high prices due to lower product quality or inferior marketing, fewer intangible assets, 
higher cost of capital, more frequent location in highly competitive industries, more inefficient 
vertical integration, and smaller extent of outsourcing. In order to capture as many of these factors 
as possible, we focus on revenues of the firm as our dependent variable. In particular, we examine 
the evolution in efficiency with which firms with different ownership generate revenues from 
inputs. Our approach thus allows for domestic firms to be catching up over time on account of any 
of the aforementioned factors. Since transition is a dynamic process, we do not presume that firms 
are in a technical or economic steady state, but rather that they are trying to improve their 
performance by discovering new methods of production, importing technologies, launching new 
products, learning new managerial and marketing techniques, and establishing their brand names.8  
                                                 
7 If the best foreign-owned firms were below the frontier, then we would underestimate the gap that domestic firms need 
to cover to catch up. Since we find a lack of catch-up vis a vis the foreign-owned firms, our results would be even 
stronger if the frontier were higher. 
8 While providing some evidence related to reallocation of resources across firms (e.g., acquisitions), we do not examine 
this topic in the present paper. 
 4
Our findings are based on comprehensive panel data drawn from the Registries of Industrial 
Enterprises of the Russian and Czech Statistical Offices.  Whereas most studies of firm performance 
in transition economies have been hampered by small data sets with observations concentrated 
immediately before and after privatization, our samples approach the populations of large and 
medium-sized industrial enterprises and cover the period of 1985-2000. Aside from Brown, Earle 
and Telegdy (2006), no other study uses such comprehensive data on manufacturing firms with as 
many annual observations as we do.  Unlike Brown et al. (2006), we include data on new firms 
rather than using only firms that existed under communism, examine the nature of the gap and 
convergence, analyze how the gap and convergence are affected by competition, probability of 
foreign acquisition, new firm creation, and other industry-specific effects, and use instrumental 
variables (IVs) in estimation.  We analyze the period 1992-2000 after mass privatization took off in 
both countries, and we exploit the earlier data in constructing a special set of IVs.  
We first estimate the average effects of the four different types of ownership (foreign, 
domestic private, state, and mixed) on revenue efficiency during the entire 1992-2000 period and 
check the robustness of our results with several estimation methods. We next estimate the efficiency 
effects of ownership over three sub-periods characterizing the early (1992-94), middle (1995-97) 
and mature (1998-2000) transition.9  Our findings for the 1992-2000 period are sobering: while the 
average efficiency effect of foreign ownership relative to SOE is strongly positive in both countries, 
the effect of domestic private and mixed ownership compared to SOE is only about 8-10% in the 
Czech Republic and it is negative (about 11% in our preferred specification) in Russia. This 
suggests that privatization to domestic owners did not have a major efficiency-enhancing effect 
during the first post-privatization decade. Moreover, the estimates for the three periods show that 
the three types of domestic firms are not catching up to the world standard given by the efficiency 
of the foreign-owned firms. In the Czech Republic the gap between these three types of domestic 
                                                 
9In these three sub-periods market institutions increasingly take hold and different shocks occur.  In Russia problems 
such as the overvalued ruble, lack of enterprise restructuring and non-payment of liabilities diminished by 1998, but the 
country experienced a financial crisis in August of that year. (Interestingly, the effects of this crisis were relatively short 
as the value of the ruble stabilized and GDP growth resumed within two quarters.) The 1998-2000 period in Russia is 
hence already one of relatively mature transition.  In the Czech Republic, mass privatization, price liberalization and 
macro stabilization were completed by 1995. A recession set in 1996-1997 but the 1998-2000 period was one of 
renewed economic growth and mature reforms as the country was preparing for entry into EU. 
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firms and the world standard is smaller than in Russia and it ceases to increase after 1997, whereas 
in Russia the domestic firms continue to fall behind even after 1997, albeit slightly. While in both 
countries the relationship between state, private and mixed firms remains similar throughout the 
distribution of efficiency and over time, the gap between the best foreign and best domestic firms is 
much larger than the gap between the worst foreign and worst domestic firms.  Neither the more nor 
the less efficient domestic firms reduced their distance to the frontier over the 1992-2000 period.    
We next explore to what extent these findings are driven by differences in the starting 
positions of foreign and domestic firms or by differences in their learning over time.  In other 
words, are domestic firms not catching up because they consistently enter at a lower level of 
efficiency or because they increase their efficiency more slowly than foreign firms over time?  We 
find that foreign startups are more efficient than domestic ones, which in turn are more efficient 
than existing domestic firms.  We also show that foreign firms tend to acquire more efficient 
domestic firms, although the economic effect of this statistically significant result is limited.  With 
respect to learning, we show that on average domestic firms improve their efficiency more slowly 
than foreign firms.  These results are buttressed by our estimates of conditional (β) convergence 
within ownership-specific distributions of efficiency.  We show that in both countries foreign 
owned firms converge to a higher steady state level of efficiency than the three types of domestic 
firms and that in Russia the foreign firms are also converging faster than the domestic ones.   
The paper is organized as follows.  In Section 2 we present our estimation strategy, data, and 
findings on the evolution of efficiency by ownership.  In Section 3 we examine the key factors that 
may explain the patterns found in Section 2.  We draw conclusions in Section 4. 
2. Evolution of Efficiency by Ownership 
In this section, we establish the key stylized facts.  First, we estimate the average efficiency 
with which firms of different ownership types generate revenue from inputs over the 1992-2000 
period.  Second, we investigate how the gap in efficiency has changed over time at the mean and at 
various points in the ownership-specific efficiency distributions.   
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We carry out our estimations with annual panel data on nearly the entire population of large- 
and medium-sized industrial firms in the Czech Republic and Russia for the 1992-2000 period. The 
data are based on the reports from all medium and large industrial (manufacturing, mining and 
utility) firms submitted to the Russian Statistical Office and the Czech Statistical Office. As seen in 
appendix Table A1, we restrict our sample to firms in the industrial sector with 100 or more 
employees in at least one year because the data on smaller firms are not fully representative.  Our 
estimates are based on data for 1,537 to 2,970 firms a year in the Czech Republic and 15,035 to 
19,209 firms in a year in Russia.  In the Czech Republic, employment in these firms covers between 
86% and 100% of total employment in firms with more than 100 employees.  The Russian sample 
represents between 70% and 94% of total employment outside the legally defined small firms.   
We have carefully examined the data, removed inconsistencies in variable definitions and 
measurement units, and standardized as much as possible the classification of industry and 
ownership across the two countries. For example, we have made the industry categories comparable 
between the two countries by recoding the 5-digit OKONKh Russian Classification of Industries 
and the 2-digit NACE Czech Industry Classification into 2-digit ISIC codes. The definitions of the 
variables are provided in appendix Table A2 and discussed further below. We have also improved 
the panel nature of the data by using information from previous years and from other registries to 
find firms that changed their identification number. In particular, in the early 1990s firms that 
changed their legal status could also change their identification number. We matched these firms to 
their parent firms by using previous year’s information on name, address, and values of variables. 
2.1. The Average Gaps for 1992-2000  
Our principal results are derived from an overall translog revenue function, which in our 










1lnln 0  (1) 
 7
where yit represents the revenue of firm i in period t, xikt is a vector of k inputs, Zit is a vector of 
ownership categories, I's and T’s denote sets of dummy variables for industries and years, 
respectively, vi are unobserved time-invariant firm-specific effects, and εit is an independently 
distributed error term. The specification allows efficiency to vary across types of ownership, 
industries, and time.10 We also carry out estimations at the level of individual two- and three-digit 
ISIC industries to capture in-depth variations in technology, extent of competition and the effects of 
ownership across different industries.  
As mentioned earlier, we use revenue as our main dependent variable in order to capture the 
change in firm performance in a number of dimensions, including improved productive efficiency 
and ability to charge higher prices on account of marketing and improved product and brand 
development.  In order to control for time-varying differences in revenue across industries, we 
deflate each firm’s revenue by a two-digit industry-specific producer price index.  
We use two inputs: capital and labor. For capital, we use the average nominal value of fixed 
assets for a given year, with annual time dummy variables serving as a capital goods deflator.  The 
labor variable is the average number of full-time equivalent workers. Ideally, we would like to 
include material inputs as a regressor, but we do not have information on this variable in Russia. In 
the Czech Republic, however, where the data permit us to estimate equation (1) with material inputs 
(as well as a value added regression without material inputs), we find that our results are not 
affected by the exclusion of material inputs.11  
We use four categories of firm ownership:  private (domestically owned), state, mixed, and 
foreign.  In Russia, the categories are based on 100% ownership, except for foreign ownership, 
where firms with any foreign ownership are classified as foreign.  In the Czech Republic, ownership 
                                                 
10 As we discuss in appendix Table A2, we also include several dummy variables to control for potential outliers and 
major events. 
11 The lack of difference in the estimates in the Czech data probably stems from the fact that material inputs tend to vary 
proportionately to labor or capital and in a fixed way across industries. 
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categories, including foreign, are based on majority ownership.  Hence, in the Czech Republic the 
category of mixed ownership includes firms in which no single type of owners has more than a 50% 
stake, while in Russia, the mixed category includes firms with no foreign ownership and no single 
type of domestic owner with 100% ownership.  Mixed ownership in Russia therefore includes firms 
with much more concentrated ownership than in the Czech Republic.  Moreover, in the Czech 
Republic firms classified as foreign are majority foreign-owned, while in Russia they may have 
only a small foreign ownership stake.  Finally, unlike in Russia, in the Czech Republic firms with 
mixed ownership may (and often do) have significant minority ownership by foreign investors. 
As may be seen from Table 1, in terms of number of firms, employment and output, both 
countries display a pattern of declining state and rising private ownership during the 1990s.  They 
differ in the relative share of firms with foreign ownership, which is much smaller in Russia despite 
the more inclusive definition of this category.  For example, the Russian share of foreign firms in 
2000 is about one-fifth of the share in the Czech Republic.  In both countries the average foreign 
firm is larger in terms of both employment and output than the average domestic firm. Note, 
however, that in the mid 1990s foreign firms in Russia included relatively small firms, so that the 
foreign share in the number of firms exceeded the foreign share in employment and output.12 
As with any estimation, endogeneity of regressors is an important issue.  The complication 
in our case is that the common problem of input endogeneity is entwined with the potential 
correlation between ownership types and the unobserved firm-specific efficiency.  Rewrite equation 
(1) in a vector form as: 
itiititit vZXy ερβ +++=ln ,  (2) 
where X is a vector of inputs and dummy variables for industry and years, Z is a vector of categories 
of ownership, and E(vi) = E(εit) = E(viεit) = E(εitεis) = 0 for ∀ t > s.  Unobserved firm-specific 
                                                 
12 Our data do not permit us to distinguish foreign firms that are subsidiaries of multinational corporations from those 
that are not.  
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productivity could determine the ownership type by influencing the governments’ decisions to 
privatize or investors’ decisions to acquire the firm.  Moreover, potential new owners may respond 
to past productivity shocks.  Thus, ownership enters equation (2) as a “predetermined variable” that 
may be correlated with past shocks (εis) and with firm-specific unobservables (vi) but not with 
present errors -- E(Zitεis) ≠ 0 for ∀  t > s, E(Zitvi) ≠ 0, and E(Zitεit) = 0. 
Under these conditions, the OLS and random effects (RE) estimators may be biased and 
inconsistent.  The fixed effects (FE) and first difference (FD) estimators allow for the correlation of 
Zit with vi but aggravate the measurement error by increasing the noise-to-true signal ratio (e.g., 
Griliches and Hausman, 1986), thus often leading to zero ownership effects.13  In addition, the first 
differencing equation makes ownership endogenous as E(Zitεi-1) ≠ 0 leads to E(Zit-Zit-1, εit-εit-1) ≠ 0.  
We therefore treat the FE and FD estimates with caution. 
To address the endogeneity of inputs, several treatment methods have been proposed, 
including the Blundell-Bond (2000) system GMM estimator (henceforth BB), the Olley-Pakes 
(1996) investment proxy estimator, and the Levinsohn-Petrin (2003) intermediate input proxy 
estimator.  There are no such methods to treat the problem of endogeneity in ownership.  Largely 
because of the lack of valid instruments for ownership, the common practice in the privatization 
literature has been to use OLS, RE or FE estimators.14  Our data allow us to go further in treating 
the potential endogeneity of ownership since we can exploit the fact that we have information on 
the firms’ supervisory ministries under central planning.  The individual ministries were historically 
in charge of specific SOEs and had in their jurisdictions firms of various sizes (revenue levels). 
Most ministries were in charge of specific firms for decades. The individual ministries were also 
key in determining the timing, extent and nature of privatization.  The ministries were independent 
of one another and in Russia there were over a hundred of them (thirty seven for our industrial firm 
sample) operating at the federal, regional and municipal levels of government.  Given their 
                                                 
13 The measurement error problem is especially severe for variables with little variation over time.  Since we have a 
significant number of firms for which we do not observe ownership changes (65.6% of firms in the Czech Republic and 
46.1% in Russia) and only few firms where we observe ownership changing more than once during 1992-2000 (8.5% in 
the Czech Republic and 13.4% in Russia), it is preferable not to rely on the FE or FD estimates.  With limited observed 
changes in ownership, a small amount of measurement error in ownership classification may create a high noise to 
signal ratio. RE estimates use within and cross sectional information and are hence less affected by this problem. 
14 See Hanousek et al. (2007) for an exception. 
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independence and different regional jurisdictions, their privatization decisions were quite 
idiosyncratic -- e.g., the federal ones were more likely to be motivated by maximizing the revenues 
from privatization and the local ones by generating employment.  With the regime change in the 
early 1990s, the ministries lost control over the firms in their jurisdiction and were no longer 
informed about their performance. In particular, they were no longer able to give binding orders, 
transfer resources and obtain detailed information about the performance of the firms in the rapidly 
changing environment.15 
We use information on the supervisory ministries in two approaches for treating endogeneity 
of ownership. In the 2SLS-RE estimator, we use ministry categories and one-year lagged X’s and 
Z’s to estimate a binary (probit) ownership model for each ownership type: 
( ) ( )MZXGMZXZ ttjttjt ,11,11 ,,|1P −−−− == , (3) 
where j denotes the ownership type and M a vector of ministry categories.  We use the fitted 
probabilities from the probit, ijĜ  , as instruments for ownership categories and the model is hence 
exactly identified.  The F-test values of the ministry dummy variables in the first stage equation are 
all well above 100, indicating that they are very good predictors of the ownership categories.16  The 
predicted probabilities have useful properties as instruments for binary endogenous variables – the 
IV estimator is asymptotically efficient, the fitted probabilities stay within the [0,1] range, and the 
first stage equation need not be correctly specified (e.g., Wooldridge, 2002). Since new firms do not 
have a supervisory ministry from the communist era, we assign them a special “ministry” dummy 
variable that reflects the common licensing and other conditions that they have to fulfill to start 
business. 
Our second approach is to treat ownership as a predetermined variable in a static BB 
estimation.  The inputs and ownership variables are instrumented with lags of their own levels in a 
FD specification, and with lags of their own first differences in a levels specification.  The 
                                                 
15 The correlations between industry dummies in the Xit vector of regressors and the ministry dummies identifying the effect 
of ownership variables are low.  In Russia, for instance, firms in the same industry reported to different ministries at the 
federal, regional, and municipal levels.  
16 The F test values for Russia (Czech Republic) are 4,778 (229) for foreign firms, 5,211 (1,470) for domestic private 
firms, 965 (124) for firms with mixed ownership, and 4,778 (2,244) for SOEs. 
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ministries under central planning are included as instruments for all endogenous variables.  We find 
the Hausman test rejects OLS in favor of the IV estimates in BB. 
Finally, at a more informal level we have checked that ministries that would be expected to 
be associated with particular types of ownership changes indeed are more likely to be associated 
with them than others. We find that shifts from state to foreign ownership are more likely to be 
observed in ministries dealing with firms (e.g., ministries of industries) than those dealing with 
strategic institutions (e.g., ministries of foreign affairs or interior). 
The estimates of average efficiency effects by ownership for the Czech Republic and Russia 
during 1992-2000 are reported in Table 2.17  The ownership coefficients are for private, mixed and 
foreign firms relative to the SOEs, the base.18 In order to assess the robustness of our results, we 
report coefficients from the OLS, QREG, RE, FE, 2SLS-RE, and BB estimations.  All six methods 
yield the same pattern of key results:   
First, firms with foreign ownership are found to be significantly more efficient than the 
SOEs, with the differential being greater in Russia than in the Czech Republic. The true efficiency 
differences are likely to be above the fixed effects estimates, which are most affected by the 
measurement-error-driven attenuation bias. For the reasons outlined above, we believe the 2SLS-RE 
estimates to be the best, which yields an average foreign-SOE efficiency premium for the 1992-
2000 period of 34.9 log points (41.7%) in the Czech Republic and 62.9 log points (87.6%) in 
Russia. These estimates are somewhat higher than those obtained by Brown et al. (2006).  
Second, firms with foreign ownership are on average much more efficient than both 
domestic private firms and firms with mixed ownership. The differences in coefficients are 
statistically significant at 1% test level. 
Third, within each country firms with private and mixed ownership generate similar 
efficiency coefficients in most estimates.  In the Czech Republic, these two types of firms are found 
                                                 
17 The complete sets of translog coefficients are available upon request.  The ownership effects do not change 
substantially when we constrain the translog production function to have constant returns to scale or use more restrictive 
functional forms such as Cobb Douglas. 
18 Note from Table 1 that the number of SOEs decreases over time but remains sufficiently large for SOE to be usable 
as the base.  This permits us to avoid switching the base over time and forcing the reader to reinterpret the results 
accordingly.  Using the SOEs as a base is also appealing conceptually since state ownership constitutes the original 
category from which most firms evolved and to which one naturally wants to compare the alternatives. 
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to be approximately 10% more efficient than the SOEs, while in Russia the pooled OLS, QREG, 
and BB estimates suggest that these firms are somewhat more efficient than the SOEs, but the RE, 
FE, and 2SLS-RE coefficients point to the contrary. 
We have performed a number of additional robustness tests.  First, we test whether the 
results are sensitive to the exclusion of material inputs. We re-estimate equation (1) with the Czech 
data using value added as the dependent variable.  The results, reported in the second panel of Table 
2, show that there is very little change in the coefficients on ownership in all the specifications with 
two exceptions: the FE estimates for mixed and the BB estimates for mixed and private firms. The 
results for the Czech Republic are also very similar when we estimate the revenue equation with 
materials included as a regressor. All estimates continue to indicate that the gap in efficiency 
between the foreign and the three types of domestic firms is large in the Czech Republic and the 
efficiency of domestic private firms is on average only about 10% greater than that of SOEs.   
The data for the Czech Republic also enable us to test whether using the Levinsohn-Petrin 
(2003) method to control for endogeneity of inputs changes our results. We find that the coefficients 
on the ownership variables (standard errors in parentheses) come close to those of the BB estimates: 
0.319 (0.017) for foreign firms, 0.110 (0.014) for mixed firms, and 0.115 (0.013) for private firms, 
with SOEs as the base. We therefore expect that the BB estimates for Russia provide similar values 
to those that we would find there if we could use the Levinsohn-Petrin method.  
The data for Russia (but not the Czech Republic) in turn permit us to check the sensitivity of 
our findings to different levels of aggregation of industry.  We find that the estimated coefficients 
on ownership from the specification including four digit ISIC dummies to control for heterogeneity 
across industries are similar to those using two digit ISIC dummies.19 Hence, controlling for 
heterogeneity at the two versus four digit ISIC level does not appear to affect our findings. 
To the extent that small firms behave differently from large firms, the unweighted 
regressions in Table 2 give excessive weight to small companies.  For instance, large foreign firms 
could more likely be subsidiaries of multinationals and as a result could be more efficient than small 
foreign firms.  We have therefore also re-estimated the regressions in Table 2 with all observations 
                                                 
19 The results are available from authors upon request. 
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weighted by employment.  The coefficients are similar to, but smaller in magnitude than, those in 
Table 2 for all but the BB estimates, which become insignificant or switch signs.  However, the 
instability of BB estimates (due in part to linear dependency of the moments) has been recognized 
in other studies (see Gorodnichenko, 2005). Overall, the weighted regression results suggest that the 
differentials in efficiency exist for firms of all sizes, but are greater among the smaller firms. 
Finally, one may ask whether the finding of the relatively high efficiency of foreign-owned 
firms is being driven by industries where there is a higher share of foreign firms or where there may 
be less competition.  As we show in Tables A3 (for the Czech Republic) and A4 (for Russia), this is 
not the case. We present the coefficients on foreign, mixed and private ownership estimated at the 
two-digit (three-digit) ISIC level for industries in which there are at least 10 (40) foreign-firm 
observations for the Czech Republic (Russia).20  The tables also contain the number of foreign and 
total firm observations and the Herfindahl index for each industry.  Finally, the industries are ranked 
by the size of the foreign coefficient so as to make it easier to see that the effect of foreign 
ownership is not a function of share of foreign firms or degree of competition in the industry.21   
2.2. Changes in the Gaps over Time 
Having established the average differences in efficiency during 1992-2000, we next ask to 
what extent the gap between the foreign and domestically owned firms is closing over time -- i.e., 
are domestic firms catching up to the world standard?  In order to answer this question, we estimate 
the revenue function separately for 1992-94, 1995-97 and 1998-2000, allowing the efficiency 
effects of different types of ownership to change over the three periods.  In addition, we compare 
domestic and foreign firms at corresponding percentiles of their respective efficiency distributions 
in order to assess how the best and worst firms in each ownership category compare with each 
other.  We define the best (worst) firms as those in the upper (lower) quartile or decile of the 
distribution of efficiency in their specific ownership type.  
                                                 
20 In order conserve space, we selected industries with some foreign presence; these industries represent about 90% of 
all the industries in each data set. We are not able to go beyond the two-digit level classification in the Czech Republic 
and since we want to show as much detail as possible, we disaggregate to the three-digit level in Russia. 
21 The detailed industry-specific information provided in these tables permits one to examine the industries for any other 
potential factors that might be driving the foreign-owned coefficient, such as the likelihood of the industry being export-
oriented or regulated. None of these other factors appears to be driving the results. 
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We carry out two estimations comparing firms with different types of ownership at various 
points of the efficiency distribution.  First, we estimate a series of quantile regressions of the form 
[ ] θθθ ρβ ititititit ZXZXyQ +=,|ln , (4) 
where Qθ is the θth quantile of ln yit conditional on the covariates X and Z.  The estimated 
coefficients ρθ  give the relative efficiency of firms with different ownership at the θth quantile.  The 
quantile approach provides a flexible estimation of all coefficients at different levels of efficiency.  
A potential drawback of the quantile estimates is that they do not control for firm-specific 
unobserved heterogeneity.  As a result, we also use the panel estimates of equation (2) and for each 
firm i we calculate efficiency as ii v+= ρϕ  for each ownership type, with E(ϕi) = ρ and E(vi) = 0.  
The idiosyncratic errors (εit) are excluded from the measure of firm-specific efficiency in order to 
reduce the effect of transitory productivity shocks and statistical noise.  To allow for the variation in 
efficiency over time, the coefficients are estimated for each three-year panel. 
 The two approaches permit us to compare the efficiency of firms with different types of 
ownership at all points of the efficiency distribution, but they differ in their underlying constraints: 
the panel framework allows productive efficiency to vary across firms but constrains the production 
function coefficients to be identical for all firms, while the quantile approach constrains productive 
efficiency to be the same for all firms in a given percentile of the distribution but permits the 
production function coefficients to vary across percentiles. 
The results of the RE, 2SLS-RE and quantile regressions for each sub-period are reported in 
Tables 3 and 4 for the Czech Republic and Russia, respectively.22 The results of the quantile 
regressions are also depicted in Figure 1. They yield the following insights:  
i) Foreign firms are considerably more efficient than all three types of domestic firms at 
virtually all levels of the distribution of relative efficiency – from the best to the worst.23  At the 
same time, the differences in the distributions of efficiency of the three types of domestic firms are 
                                                 
22 The OLS estimates are very similar to the quantile regression estimates and are hence not reported to conserve space. 
23 The exception is the foreign-mixed efficiency differential which is insignificant in the bottom decile in Russia and the 
bottom half of the distribution in the Czech Republic at the start of the transition (1992-94) and also in the bottom decile 
in the Czech Republic in mature transition (1998-2000).  In this context, it must be remembered that in the Czech 
Republic firms with mixed ownership include foreign firms with less than 50% ownership stake. 
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relatively small, with mixed and private firms being 0-25% more efficient than state-owned firms at 
nearly every point of the distribution and in each of the three periods.   
ii) The gap between the efficiency of the foreign firms and all three types of domestic firms 
is greatest among the more efficient firms (75th and 90th percentiles) and smallest among the least 
efficient ones (10th and 25th percentiles).  An exception is the foreign-state efficiency gap in the 
Czech Republic during 1998-2000, when the relative efficiency of the worst (remaining) Czech 
SOEs actually drops and the foreign-state difference in efficiency becomes the greatest in the 
bottom decile (61.5 log points).24  The fact that these inefficient SOEs did not go out of business is 
consistent with the finding of Lizal and Svejnar (2002) that bank lending for investment pointed to 
important signs of soft budget constraints (bailouts) among the large and medium size Czech firms 
in the 1990s.  The large efficiency differentials that we find in Russia between firms with foreign 
ownership and all other firms are likely also signs of the presence of soft budget constraints.  
iii) Compared to the Czech Republic, the gap between the foreign and domestic firms in 
Russia is much larger and increases more rapidly from the worst to the best firms.  For example, in 
the first period in Russia the foreign-private domestic difference in efficiency (last column) ranges 
from -5.9 log points in 10th decile to 97.6 in the 90th decile, while in the Czech Republic the 
corresponding log point differentials are 16.8 and 31.8. 
iv) Using the estimates from Tables 3 and 4, we present in Table A5 the changes over time 
of the efficiency gap between foreign and domestic firms. In Russia the gap grows at virtually all 
points of the distribution from early to mid transition, and the growth continues to be positive 
though smaller in mid to late transition.  In the Czech Republic, there is not a significant change in 
the foreign-domestic gap for mixed and private firms over time, but the foreign-state gap grows at 
the bottom of the distribution in the presence of the soft budgets of SOEs discussed above.  
The corresponding panel results, which take into account firm heterogeneity, are depicted in 
appendix Figure A1.  The figure is constructed on the basis of the RE estimates of ϕi, but the FE 
and 2SLS-RE estimates are highly correlated and do not alter our conclusions.  We order firms in 
                                                 
24 The fact that in mature transition the remaining least efficient Czech SOEs were considerably less efficient than the 
other types of firms supports the Gupta, Ham, and Svejnar (2000) models and empirical findings that better firms were 
privatized first. 
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each ownership category by ϕi and compare efficiency across ownership categories relative to the 
SOEs.  The patterns in relative efficiency obtained by the RE panel and quantile estimations are 
very similar: the gap between the foreign and domestic firms is larger in Russia than in the Czech 
Republic and it is greater among the more than the less efficient firms in all three periods.   
In sum, we have carried out several tests of whether domestic firms approach the efficiency 
of foreign firms during the first decade of the transition.  Our findings suggest that the answer is a 
no in both countries, irrespective of whether we compare the central tendency or counterpart firms 
at various parts of their respective efficiency distributions. The average results overstate the gap at 
the bottom of the distribution and understate it at the top.  The gap grows in the first half of the 
transition in both countries, but much faster in Russia.  Between the second and third period the gap 
continues to grow (but more slowly) in Russia in all except the most efficient firms, while it 
stabilizes or shrinks for all firms except the least efficient SOEs in the Czech Republic. Foreign 
firms are also increasingly displacing local firms in the top deciles of the efficiency distribution.25  
3.  Factors Affecting Evolution of Efficiency Gap  
Why the efficiency gap between foreign and domestic firms is not closing over time and 
why it is larger in Russia than in the Czech Republic? With respect to the former, we focus on 
whether the gap results from initial differences between foreign and domestic firms or from 
differences in the evolutions of their efficiency (learning) over time. We also ask if the gap is due in 
part to better domestic firms being acquired by foreign investors. Finally, with an eye to policy 
implications, we briefly explore the nature of differences in the gaps between the two countries. 
3.1. Startups 
We start by using a nonparametric approach to comparing the efficiency levels of entering 
firms by ownership type.  We use firm-specific estimates of efficiency calculated from standardized 
                                                 
25 In Russia in 1992-1994, the few foreign firms (1.4% of all firms) are disproportionately represented in the highest 
decile of the efficiency distribution (4.6%).  Over time as the share of foreign firms in the economy rises to 3.3% and 
4.9% in 1995-1997 and 1998-2000, respectively, their share in the top decile of the efficiency distribution rises even 
faster, to 14.3% and 21.8% in these respective time periods.  In the Czech Republic one observes a more marked 
penetration of foreign owned firms and growing representation in the top decile of the efficiency distribution.  For 
example, in 1998-2000 foreign firms represent 25.3% of all firms but 51.5% of firms in the top decile. 
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residuals of the translog function estimated separately for each year during the 1992-2000 period.26  
Based on its individual efficiency measure, each startup firm is categorized by whether it enters in 
the bottom, middle or top third of the overall distribution of efficiency in each year.  In both 
countries foreign firms turn out to have a higher (0.5) probability of entering in the top third of the 
distribution than any type of domestic firms (whose probability is 0.3). The only exception is in the 
Czech Republic, where firms with mixed ownership, containing firms with significant foreign 
ownership, have a similarly high probability of entering at the top third of the distribution.  
Our first parametric test consists of augmenting equation (1) with interaction terms between 
ownership dummy variables and a variable “startup,” which is coded one in the first year of a firm’s 
existence and zero otherwise.  The coefficient on interaction terms gives the average efficiency of 
startups relative to existing firms in the same ownership category over the 1992-2000 period.  Our 
second test consists of adding to this specification the interaction of the startup by ownership type 
with calendar time.  The coefficients on these terms indicate whether the relative efficiency of 
startups of different ownership types changes over time. In Table 5 we present the RE and QREG 
estimates.27 With respect to our first test, we show that in both countries the newly created foreign 
firms are less efficient than existing foreign firms. However, by adding the ownership specific 
startup coefficients to the corresponding base ownership coefficients, we find that with the 
exception of Czech startups with mixed ownership (which often have foreign investors), foreign 
owned startups are more efficient than domestic startups. Moreover, except for the RE estimate in 
Russia, domestic startups are found to be more efficient than existing domestic firms.  The question 
that arises is whether the gap between foreign and domestic startups is closing or widening over 
time. The RE (but not QREG) coefficients on “Startup*Ownership*Time” indicate that in the Czech 
Republic the efficiency of startup firms with foreign ownership is rising faster over time than that of 
domestic startups, hence contributing to a widening of the overall efficiency gap among foreign and 
                                                 
26 We standardize the residuals because there may be year-to-year variation in the distribution of the residuals that 
reflects changes in inflation, or shocks to the economy, which need to be controlled for. 
27 We are unable to estimate the 2SLS-RE specification because there are no ministries assigned to the firms that are 
created after 1992.  
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domestic firms.  The opposite is true in Russia, where both RE and QREG estimates suggest that the 
domestic startups are gaining over the foreign startups and thus reduce the overall gap over time.   
3.2. Selective Acquisitions by Foreign Firms 
An alternative but complementary hypothesis about the superior performance of foreign-
owned firms is that foreign investors acquire (“cream”) the more productive domestic firms.  This 
hypothesis implies that foreign investors (a) reduce the average efficiency of domestic firms by 
deteriorating their composition and (b) gain efficiency advantage by selective acquisition of firms 
rather than by special capabilities that they bring in or by superior learning and other gradual 
improvements in performance.  A competing hypothesis, also consistent with the evidence provided 
earlier, is that foreign investors select less efficient firms and turn them around. 
  To test these hypotheses we estimate a probit model indicating whether the more or less 
efficient domestic firms have a greater probability of being acquired by foreign investors.  In 
particular, we test whether the efficiency of a domestic firm in year t-1 affects the probability of the 
firm being acquired by a foreign firm in year t.28  We control for the firm’s ownership at t-1 and 
ownership interacted with calendar time, the logarithm of the firm’s capital (to control for size), and 
industry, year and regional dummy variables.29 The marginal effects from the probit, reported in 
Table 6, indicate that in both countries foreign investors tend to acquire the more efficient domestic 
firms.  The effect is larger in the Czech Republic than in Russia, but its economic significance is 
limited in both countries.  One standard deviation increase in domestic firm’s efficiency leads to an 
increase in the mean annual probability of the firm being acquired by a foreign firm from 2.12% to 
2.87% in the Czech Republic and from 0.41% to 0.45% in Russia. The results hence suggest that 
foreign investors “cream” but that the part of their superior performance that can be explained by 
selective acquisitions of local firms is limited.30  Our estimates reject the competing hypothesis that 
foreign investors select less efficient firms and turn them around. 
                                                 
28 The measure of productive efficiency continues to be the annual RE firm-specific residual estimated from the translog 
production functions for each year, which we normalize to have zero mean and unitary standard deviation.  
29 Coefficients on more distant lags of the efficiency variable were statistically insignificant.  Foreign investors hence 
seem to be guided by current performance. 
30 Given that SOEs are the base and the linear time trend captures the interaction of state ownership and time, the 
estimates in Table 6 indicate that in the Czech Republic foreign investors are more likely to acquire domestic private 
firms than SOEs and that the probability of acquisitions rises for all types of firms (but fastest for SOEs) over time.  In 
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A question that also arises is whether foreign firms acquire firms in less competitive 
industries and the efficiency differential reflects monopoly rents.  To examine this hypothesis, we 
enter a two-digit Herfindahl index as an additional explanatory variable to the probit equation.  As 
may be seen from Table 6, the marginal effect of the Herfindahl index is negative in both countries 
and statistically significant in the Czech Republic.  Foreign firms hence tend to acquire firms in 
more rather than less competitive industries in the Czech Republic and the acquisitions are 
unrelated to the competitiveness in the industry of acquisition in Russia. The greater efficiency of 
foreign firms hence does not appear to be attributable to acquisition-related monopoly rents. 
3.3. Differential Rates of Learning and Innovation by Existing Firms 
We next examine how quickly domestic and foreign firms improve their efficiency in the 
two emerging market economies.  In general, foreign firms start their operations in emerging 
markets with limited local knowledge and their efficiency rises over time as they acquire this 
knowledge.  Domestic firms in turn enter the transition with a lack of knowledge of the market 
economy, as well as a lack of western managerial and technical know-how.  Their efficiency 
increases as they acquire this knowledge. The question is therefore whether foreign or domestic 
firms learn more rapidly. A related question is whether firms that are closer to the efficiency frontier 
learn more rapidly.  Finally, we assess whether domestic and foreign firms converge to the same or 
different steady state level of efficiency and whether they do so at similar or different speed.  
We start by adding to equation (1) a vector of regressors capturing the interaction of τ (the 
length of time since the firm has been in a given ownership) and ownership dummies.  The 
estimates of these time varying coefficients, presented in Table 7, indicate that in both countries 
foreign firms are improving their efficiency at a faster rate than any of the domestic firms. In the 
Czech Republic the efficiency of all types of domestic firms has on average declined steadily since 
the new owners took ownership, while the efficiency of foreign firms has increased.   In Russia, the 
efficiency of domestic owners may or may not have declined, depending on model specification, 
                                                                                                                                                                  
Russia, firms with mixed and private ownership have a lower base probability than a SOE of being acquired by a 
foreign firm, but their mean probability of being acquired by a foreign investor rises over time.  Finally, in both 
economies, the probability of a firm being acquired rises with the size of its capital stock, indicating that foreign 
investors tend to acquire larger rather than smaller firms. 
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but the rate at which foreigners “learn” is much greater, thus contributing to the larger foreign-
domestic gap observed in Russia than in the Czech Republic.   
We next test the hypothesis, advanced by Aghion et al. (2002 and 2003) and Acemoglu, 
Aghion, and Zilibotti (2002 and 2003), that competition brought about by the introduction of the 
market system (transition) and entry of new firms encourages learning and innovative behavior of 
firms that are near the technological frontier, but stifles learning among those firms that lag 
significantly behind.  According to this view, we should observe convergence toward the frontier by 
the more efficient firms, but divergence or outright failure on the part of the less efficient firms. In 
order to provide evidence on this hypothesis, we test whether more efficient firms have a higher 
(lower) probability than less efficient firms of moving up (down) in the overall distribution of 
productive efficiency in any given year.  We also check if the less efficient firms are more likely to 
exit than the more efficient ones.  To carry out these tests, in every year we assign firms to the 
bottom third, middle third and top third of the overall efficiency distribution on the basis of their 
individual estimated efficiency.31  Within each ownership category we calculate the average annual 
probability that a firm in a given efficiency group moves to one of the other two efficiency groups, 
stays in the same group, or exits during the 1992-2000 period.  These probabilities are reported in 
3x4 annual transition matrices for each ownership category in Table 8, with the groups of origin 
being given by the row names and the groups of destination by column names.  
The proximity to the frontier hypothesis is supported by the behavior of foreign firms in 
Russia and (somewhat less so) in the Czech Republic.  It is contradicted, however, by the behavior 
of all types of domestic firms.  As may be seen from Table 8, the probability that foreign firms in 
the middle efficiency group move into the top group is higher than the probability that foreign firms 
in the bottom efficiency group move to the middle group (32.7% vs. 18.0% in Russia and 19.9% vs. 
14.6% in the Czech Republic).32  Similarly, the probability that foreign firms in the top efficiency 
group move down into the middle group is smaller than the probability that they move from the 
                                                 
31 The measure of efficiency is again each firm’s residual from an annual translog production function that is estimated 
without ownership variables.   
32 The bootstrap standard errors corresponding to the transition probabilities are very small, indicating that the 
differences in the transition probabilities that we discuss here are statistically significant at the 1% confidence level. 
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middle to the bottom group (8.8% vs. 14.6% in Russia and 13.7% vs. 14.7% in the Czech 
Republic).  In contrast, the counterpart probabilities are virtually indistinguishable within each of 
the three categories of domestically owned firms in Russia, and they are actually reversed in the 
Czech Republic.  Hence, in the Czech Republic the probability of moving from the bottom to the 
middle group is higher than the probability of moving from the middle to the top group within each 
domestic ownership category (19.2% vs. 14.7% for the SOEs, 15.1% vs. 13.0% for the private firms 
and 17.9% vs. 11.5% for firms with mixed ownership).  Similarly, the probability of moving down 
from the middle to the bottom group is smaller than moving from the top to the middle group within 
two of the three domestic ownership categories, with private firms being the exception.  
The proximity to the frontier hypothesis also does not receive much support in the 
probabilities of exit if one ignores the exit rates of the group of the least efficient firms that are 
likely to have high exit rates in general and on account of various theories.  Focusing on firms in the 
middle and top efficiency groups, it may be seen from Table 8 that in all ownership categories in 
both countries the probability of exit is similar for firms from the top and middle efficiency groups.  
In other words, the idea that firms that are further from the frontier are more likely to fail than the 
ones near the frontier is not supported by data for the top and middle-level efficiency firms.   
The transition probabilities in Table 8 also complement our findings in Table 7 that foreign 
firms learn more rapidly than domestic firms.  We find that in both countries foreign firms are more 
likely to move up in the overall efficiency distribution (especially into the top group) and stay in the 
top group than firms in any of the three domestic ownership categories, which in turn display 
similar patterns of mobility.  Firms with foreign ownership are also less likely to move down in the 
overall distribution than the other types of firms.  The differential pattern of mobility between the 
foreign and domestic firms is more pronounced in Russia than in the Czech Republic.  For example, 
in Russia foreign firms in the middle efficiency group have a 33% probability of moving into the 
top group and a 15% probability of moving into the bottom group within a year.  The corresponding 
probabilities in the state, mixed and private firms are 17-19% for moving to the top and 18-20% for 
moving to the bottom.  In the Czech Republic foreign firms in the middle group have a 20% 
probability of moving into the top group and a 15% probability of moving into the bottom group.  
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Czech state, mixed and private firms face a 12-15% probability of moving from the middle to the 
top group and a 19-23% probability of moving into the bottom group. Our estimates hence indicate 
that domestic firms are improving their efficiency slower than the foreign owned firms, a finding 
that is consistent with the hypothesis that domestic firms are learning slower than foreign firms. 
Using the 3x3 sub-matrices reflecting the bottom, middle and top efficiency states in Table 
8, we also calculate the stationary probability matrices of efficiency by ownership. With bootstrap 
standard errors being small, we find that in both economies the stationary probability that foreign 
owned firms are in the top third of the overall efficiency distribution is twice as high as the 
corresponding probability for any of the three types of domestic firms.  In the Czech Republic the 
stationary probability of the foreign firms being in the top group is 0.45, while the corresponding 
probabilities of the domestic private, mixed and state firms are 0.21, 0.22 and 0.26.  In Russia, the 
corresponding probability values are 0.69, 0.30, 0.29, and 0.30.33 
 Our analysis does not reveal any signs of convergence of domestic firms to the frontier. The 
question arises as to whether this is because domestic firms converge to a lower (steady state) level 
of efficiency than the foreign firms or because they converge at a slower speed.  We examine this 
question by estimating a dynamic conditional convergence equation of the form 
ipipipipipip uPIZZ ++++= − νδηϕκϕ 1 , (6) 
where ϕip is the logarithm of the average efficiency of each firm i in each consecutive two-year 
period p, Zip is a vector of categories of ownership (averaged across the two years within each  
period p), κ proxies the steady state efficiency levels of firms with different types of ownership, η is 
(the negative of the log of) the speed of convergence of firms to their ownership-specific steady 
state efficiency level, Iip is a set of industry dummy variables controlling for industry-specific (e.g., 
technology) factors that may affect the steady state efficiency levels of firms, and P are period 
dummies (e.g., Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004).34  Equation (6) hence allows both the steady state 
efficiency levels and the speed of convergence to vary with ownership type.  In order to reduce the 
                                                 
33 The stationary probability matrices also indicate that foreign owned firms are much less likely to be in the bottom tier 
of the efficiency distribution. The respective stationary probabilities for the foreign, mixed, private and state firms are 
0.26, 0.40, 0.45, and 0.38 for the Czech Republic and 0.13, 0.36, 0.36, and 0.37 in Russia. 
34 Although the two literatures do not cross-reference each other, equation (6) can be shown to be in the same class of 
functions as that estimated by Griffith, Redding and Simpson (2002) on British firms. 
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effects of short-term variations in the data, we use for each firm its estimated two-year average 
efficiency levels during the 1993-2000 period.  We estimate equation (6) by pooled OLS as well as 
by using the difference between the third and second lags as an instrumental variable for the first lag 
of efficiency in our level equation (see Arellano and Bover, 1995).   
The OLS and IV estimates of the conditional convergence model are reported in Table 9, 
with the SOEs again serving as the base.  As may be seen from the estimates of κ in the second and 
third rows, all three types of domestic firms are converging to the same steady state level (except 
possibly for the mixed firms in the Czech Republic).  On the other hand, foreign firms are 
converging to a 0.11 to 0.23 log point higher steady state level in the Czech Republic and a 0.34-
0.40 log point higher level of efficiency in Russia.  The estimated  η coefficient on lagged 
efficiency in row four measures the speed of convergence of the SOEs (the base category), while 
the coefficients in rows five to seven give the difference in the speed of convergence of the other 
ownerships categories relative to SOEs (where the speed of convergence is given by 1– η).  The 
estimates suggest that in the Czech Republic all four types of firms are converging to their 
respective steady states at the same speed.  In Russia, foreign firms converge at a faster speed than 
the three types of domestic firms, which are converging at the same speed.   
3.4. Institutions, Level of Development or Business Culture? 
Our estimations also permit us to contribute to an ongoing debate about what generates 
success in economic development. A broad school of thought emphasizes the role of institutions and 
the legal system. The Acemoglu et al. (2002 and 2003) and Aghion et al. (2002 and 2003) literature 
in turn stresses the importance of the achieved level of development (distance of a country from the 
frontier) -- a hypothesis that is also present in the literature on the spillover effects of foreign direct 
investment (e.g., Aitken and Harison, 1999, Griffith, Redding and Simpson, 2002, and Sabirianova, 
Svejnar and Terrell, 2005). Finally, the business leaders and analysts tend to emphasize the 
importance of modern business culture, know-how and global networking. 
In identifying a smaller domestic-foreign efficiency gap and a more successful relative 
performance over time in the Czech Republic than in Russia, our data permit us to provide evidence 
with respect to the above hypotheses.  In particular, we can go some way toward distinguishing 
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whether the different findings for Russia and the Czech Republic are brought about by differences 
in (a) the institutional/legal structure, (b) the level of economic development, and (c) the 
market/business culture stemming from the physical proximity to a western market economy.  In 
order to do so, we focus on the Moscow and St. Petersburg regions of Russia.  The Moscow region 
resembles the Czech Republic in that it is economically much more advanced (closer to the frontier) 
than the other Russian regions.  The St. Petersburg region resembles the Czech Republic in that it 
borders on a western market economy and, like the Czech Republic, is often viewed to have more of 
a western business culture.  The Moscow and St. Petersburg regions could hence be expected to 
generate similar results to those for the Czech Republic on account of the level of development and 
business culture, respectively.  Yet, the two regions share with the rest of Russia the legal and 
institutional environment, as well as the more closed nature of the Russian economy.   
To assess which effect dominates, we carry out the estimations reported in Table 2 on data 
from firms located in the Moscow and St. Petersburg regions and check whether the estimated 
coefficients resemble more those from the Czech Republic or Russia as a whole.  We find that the 
parameter estimates for both Moscow and St. Petersburg are similar to those for Russia as a whole 
rather than those for the Czech Republic. This suggests that policies and institutional environment 
rather than the level of development or geographic proximity to western business culture determine 
the relative performance of foreign and domestic firms in the emerging market economies. 
4. Conclusions 
The Czech Republic and Russia represent important alternative models of transition and 
implementation of the market-oriented policies: the Central and East European (CEE) model and 
the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) model, respectively. The two models differ 
markedly in the degree to which they have opened their markets to competition from trade and 
foreign direct investment and the extent to which they have developed market-oriented institutions 
and legal system. They hence provide alternative laboratories for testing the effects of the market-
oriented development policies on efficiency of firms. We use large firm-level data sets from these 
two countries to examine whether market liberalization during 1992-2000 enabled local firms to 
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converge in efficiency to the world standard, defined as the efficiency of foreign owned firms in 
these economies.  In doing so, we provide micro-econometric foundations for the debate about the 
effects of globalization, privatization and foreign direct investment (FDI) on development. 
The CEE and CIS countries carried out large scale privatizations on the presumption that 
this would increase the efficiency of firms and speed up economic development.  In both sets of 
economies, observers and analysts have pointed to success stories as well as evidence of mis-
management and looting of firms.  The Russian and Czech privatization schemes fit into the large 
scale privatization pattern, with the Russian scheme providing assets to insiders and the Czech one 
to outsiders. Our estimates suggest that in the Czech Republic the efficiency of firms with domestic 
private and mixed ownership is quite similar and only slightly (about 10%) higher than that of the 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Depending on the estimation method, in Russia the efficiency of 
the domestic private and mixed ownership can be slightly higher or lower than that of SOEs.  These 
results suggest that a principal justification for carrying out privatizations to domestic owners has 
not been borne out by performance during the first post-privatization decade.   
FDI has been viewed as a vehicle for development – operating through the higher efficiency 
of the multinationals and the positive “spillover” effects of foreign firms on domestic firms’ 
efficiency.  We find that foreign owned firms are far more efficient than domestic firms in both 
countries and that the gap between domestic and foreign firms is not closing – it has remained the 
same in the Czech Republic and has grown in Russia.  One factor contributing to this gap is that 
foreign-owned startups tend to be more efficient than domestic startups.   We also show that foreign 
investors tend to acquire more efficient domestic firms, although the magnitude of this effect is 
limited. Finally, we find that foreign owned firms are improving their efficiency faster than 
domestic firms and are converging to a higher level of efficiency. It may be argued that we are 
observing the short term effects of FDI, as described in the Monge-Naranjo (2002) model.  While 
this may be the case, our results cover an entire decade and thus provide sobering evidence on how 
quickly one may expect policies to start having the positive expected effect on development. 
A recent literature is hypothesizing that the market-oriented development policies are more 
effective in increasing growth/efficiency in countries/firms that are closer to the technological 
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frontier, but that the policies are too overwhelming and may even cause failure in the less efficient 
countries/firms.  Our study provides evidence related to this hypothesis at both the firm and country 
levels.  At the firm level we find the hypothesis to be supported by the behavior of foreign owned 
firms but not by the three types of domestic firms.  At the country level, we find that the foreign-
domestic efficiency gap is much larger in Russia than the Czech Republic and that it is increasing in 
Russia while remaining relatively stable in the Czech Republic over the 1992-2000 period.  This 
supports the hypothesis since the Czech Republic is closer to the “frontier” than Russia in terms of 
its initial efficiency. By comparing the Moscow and St. Petersburg regions to the Czech Republic, 
we provide evidence suggesting that it is the greater institutional/legal development and 
liberalization, rather than level of economic development or proximity to western business culture, 
that account for the different patterns observed in the Czech Republic and Russia.  
  Both the CEE and CIS countries continue to face the development challenge of how to 
bring their firms to the world efficiency standard.  The CEE economies are meeting this challenge 
by rapidly increasing the shares of their GDP and exports accounted for by foreign firms – an option 
that is not readily open to all developing countries and that raises the question of whether foreign 
capital is too foot-lose to constitute a reliable basis for long term economic development.35  In 
contrast, the Russian-style CIS economies are not standing up well to the challenge, which will 
become increasingly acute as globalization proceeds and the countries become more open.  Our 
results indicate that future research needs to examine carefully the differential effect that 
development policies, FDI and globalization have on the performance of local versus foreign-owned 
firms. 
                                                 
35 Studies by Fabbri, Haskel and Slaughter (2003), Bernard and Jensen (2002) and Bernard and Sjoholm (2003) suggest 
that controlling for firm size and productivity multinational firms are more likely to close their plants than domestic 
firms.  An evaluation of the welfare effects of foreign ownership hence needs to examine other factors in addition to 
whether domestic firms that are being displaced by foreign firms are the poorly or well performing ones. 
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Table 1: Percentage Share of Industrial Firms, Employment and Output by Ownership Type, 
for Selected Years 
 
 Czech Republic Russia 
  1992 1996      2000 1993 1996 2000 
Firm Shares        
Foreign 3.5 12.6 30.7 1.8 3.5 5.6 
Mixed  0.7 21.0 12.9 32.6 42.7 28.2 
Private (domestic)   18.4 57.4 54.1 16.7 38.3 51.3 
State 77.4 9.0 2.4 48.9 15.6 15.0 
Employment Shares       
Foreign 2.6 12.1 33.7 0.7 1.9 11.5 
Mixed  0.1 42.6 25.9 38.0 56.2 35.2 
Private (domestic)   10.2 36.7 37.6 9.0 28.0 44.5 
State 87.0 8.6 2.9 52.3 13.8 8.8 
Output Shares       
Foreign 7.7 21.4 51.1 2.3 3.0 19.6 
Mixed  0.1 40.8 22.3 45.5 68.6 33.3 
Private (domestic)   7.6 30.6 24.9 6.8 19.5 41.7 
State 84.6 7.2 1.7 45.4 8.9 5.4 
No. of observations 1537 2283      2084 17923 17138 15035 
 
Notes:  In the Czech Republic the ownership category is based on majority ownership while in Russia, it is based on 
100% ownership, except for foreign ownership, which can be partial.  The sample consists of firms with non-missing 
values for industry, ownership, output, fixed assets, and employment. 
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Table 2: Average Effects of Ownership on Efficiency, 1992-2000 
 
Czech Republic 
Dependent Variable = Revenue 
 OLS QREG RE FE 2SLS-RE BB 
Foreign 0.435** 0.413** 0.319** 0.275** 0.349** 0.657** 
 (0.019) (0.021) (0.017) (0.019) (0.024) (0.037) 
Mixed 0.122** 0.086** 0.110** 0.094** 0.097** 0.074* 
 (0.019) (0.022) (0.014) (0.015) (0.020) (0.031) 
Private 0.145** 0.122** 0.115** 0.117** 0.075** 0.053* 
 (0.015) (0.016) (0.013) (0.014) (0.017) (0.027) 
No. of obs. 19,971 19,971 19,971 19,971 15,142 19,971 
No. of firms 4,657 4,657 4,657 4,657 3,781 4,657 
R2 0.754 0.526 0.741 0.656 0.754 … 
 
Dependent Variable = Value Added 
 OLS QREG RE FE 2SLS-RE BB 
Foreign 0.429** 0.379** 0.318** 0.174** 0.448** 0.167** 
 (0.019) (0.015) (0.021) (0.026) (0.028) (0.045) 
Mixed 0.067** 0.060** 0.023 -0.015 0.089** -0.046 
 (0.020) (0.016) (0.018) (0.020) (0.028) (0.039) 
Private 0.163** 0.133** 0.101** 0.039* 0.136** 0.043 
 (0.015) (0.012) (0.015) (0.019) (0.021) (0.033) 
No. of obs. 18,128 18,128 18,128 18,128 13,261 9,536 
No. of firms 4,604 4,604 4,604 4,604 3,618 2,698 
R2 0.732 0.542 0.726 0.666 0.735 …. 
 
Russia 
Dependent Variable = Revenue 
 OLS QREG RE FE 2SLS-RE BB 
Foreign 0.994** 0.885** 0.398** 0.176** 0.629** 0.771** 
 (0.021) (0.015) (0.019) (0.022) (0.029) (0.049) 
Mixed 0.124** 0.159** -0.020** -0.050** -0.110** 0.081** 
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.018) (0.016) 
Private 0.163** 0.174** -0.019* -0.060** -0.114** 0.140** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.018) (0.017) 
No. of obs. 153,402 153,402 153,402 153,402 140,658 153,402 
No. of firms 26,286 26,286 26,286 26,286 24,595 26,286 
R2 0.680 0.482 0.670 0.594 0.688 … 
 
Notes:  Coefficients = estimated log effects of different types of ownership relative to state ownership. Standard errors 
are in parentheses (robust in OLS); * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.  The estimates are obtained from the 
translog production function specified in equation (1) and which includes industry dummies, year dummies, and 
controls for data anomalies.  τ is the time since the change in the corresponding ownership status.  QREG – median 
regression, RE – random effects estimator, FE – fixed effects estimator, 2SLS-RE – two stage least squares random 
effect estimator, and BB – Blundell-Bond system GMM estimator (first four lags of levels and differences in inputs 
and ownership are used as instruments for differences and levels, respectively).  Both 2SLS-RE and BB estimators use 
exogenous information on ministries under central planning as instruments for endogenous variables. 
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Table 3: Estimates of Ownership Effects by Sub-Periods, the Czech Republic 
 
Specification Foreign-State Mixed-State Private-State Foreign-Mixed Foreign-Private
 (1) (2) (3) (4)=(1)-(2) (5)=(1)-(3) 
1992-1994 
0.246** 0.137* 0.057* 0.109 0.189** RE 
(0.044) (0.057) (0.026) (0.072) (0.051) 
0.331** 0.283* 0.054 0.048 0.277** 2SLS-RE (0.054) (0.113) (0.031) (0.125) (0.062) 
Quantile:      
0.187** 0.162 0.019 0.025 0.168** 10 (0.057) (0.090) (0.035) (0.101) (0.056) 
0.285** 0.156* 0.042 0.129 0.243** 50 (0.042) (0.066) (0.025) (0.074) (0.040) 
0.389** 0.155 0.072 0.235* 0.318** 90 (0.067) (0.104) (0.038) (0.116) (0.064) 
1995-1997 
 0.195**       0.015       0.027  0.180** 0.168** RE 
    (0.025)     (0.016)     (0.016) (0.030) (0.030) 
0.266** 0.065* -0.008 0.201** 0.274** 2SLS-RE (0.042) (0.031) (0.025) (0.052) (0.049) 
Quantile:      
0.347** 0.121** 0.141** 0.225** 0.206** 10 (0.038) (0.037) (0.031) (0.038) (0.033) 
0.432** 0.063 0.146** 0.369** 0.286** 50 (0.033) (0.032) (0.026) (0.034) (0.027) 
0.470** 0.041 0.101** 0.429** 0.370** 90 (0.051) (0.050) (0.039) (0.053) (0.042) 
1998-2000 
0.218** 0.019  0.040  0.199** 0.178** RE 
(0.045) (0.043) (0.045) (0.062) (0.064) 
0.301** -0.008 0.031 0.309** 0.270** 2SLS-RE (0.070) (0.072) (0.068) (0.100) (0.098) 
Quantile:      
0.615** 0.551** 0.439** 0.065 0.177 10 (0.065) (0.069) (0.062) (0.040) (0.031) 
0.449** 0.115* 0.163** 0.334** 0.287** 50 (0.046) (0.048) (0.045) (0.028) (0.020) 
0.448** 0.000 0.127 0.447** 0.320** 90 (0.075) (0.079) (0.072) (0.044) (0.034) 
 
Notes:  Standard errors are in parentheses; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.  The estimates in columns 1-3 
are obtained from random effects (RE), two stage least squares random effects (2SLS-RE) and quantile regressions 
of sales revenue on capital and labor inputs (translog specification), industry dummies, year dummies, and controls 
for data anomalies (see text).  The omitted (base) ownership category is state ownership. 
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Table 4: Estimates of Ownership Effects by Sub-Periods, Russia 
 
Specification Foreign-State Mixed-State Private-State Foreign-Mixed Foreign-Private
 (1) (2) (3) (4)=(1)-(2) (5)=(1)-(3) 
1992-1994 
0.373** -0.016* 0.005 0.389** 0.368** RE (0.043) (0.008) (0.009) (0.044) (0.044) 
0.772** 0.046 0.011 0.726** 0.761** 2SLS-RE (0.077) (0.093) (0.058) (0.121) (0.096) 
Quantile:      
0.134* 0.213** 0.193** -0.078 -0.059 10 (0.054) (0.016) (0.019) (0.054) (0.055) 
0.455** 0.136** 0.109** 0.319** 0.346** 50 (0.036) (0.011) (0.013) (0.036) (0.037) 
1.040** 0.059** 0.064** 0.981** 0.976** 90 (0.052) (0.017) (0.019) (0.052) (0.053) 
1995-1997 
0.626** 0.116** 0.116** 0.510** 0.51** RE 
(0.033) (0.014) (0.015) (0.036) (0.036) 
0.985** 0.153** 0.165** 0.832** 0.820** 2SLS-RE (0.049) (0.031) (0.031) (0.058) (0.058) 
Quantile:      
0.517** 0.169** 0.230** 0.348** 0.287** 10 (0.047) (0.024) (0.024) (0.044) (0.045) 
0.850** 0.161** 0.186** 0.689** 0.664** 50 (0.025) (0.012) (0.013) (0.024) (0.024) 
1.388** 0.138** 0.130** 1.250** 1.258** 90 (0.032) (0.017) (0.017) (0.030) (0.031) 
1998-2000 
0.666** 0.135** 0.203** 0.531** 0.463** RE 
(0.033) (0.022) (0.022) (0.040) (0.040) 
1.223** 0.076* 0.173** 1.147** 1.050** 2SLS-RE (0.054) (0.032) (0.029) (0.063) (0.061) 
Quantile:      
0.617** 0.075* 0.163** 0.543** 0.454** 10 (0.050) (0.032) (0.031) (0.045) (0.045) 
0.980** 0.162** 0.208** 0.817** 0.772** 50 (0.026) (0.016) (0.016) (0.024) (0.024) 
1.356** 0.188** 0.248** 1.168** 1.108** 90 (0.034) (0.021) (0.020) (0.030) (0.030) 
 
Notes:  Standard errors are in parentheses; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.  The estimates in columns 1-3 
are obtained from random effects (RE), two stage least squares random effects (2SLS-RE) and quantile regressions 
of sales revenue on capital and labor inputs (translog specification), industry dummies, year dummies, and controls 
for data anomalies (see text).  The omitted (base) ownership category is state ownership. 
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Table 5:  Relative Efficiency of Startups by Ownership Type, 1992-2000  
 Czech Republic  Russia  Czech Republic  Russia 
 RE QREG  RE QREG  RE QREG  RE QREG 
Foreign 0.316** 0.406** 0.411** 0.894** 0.315** 0.419** 0.417** 0.904** 
 (0.018) (0.022) (0.020) (0.016) (0.018) (0.021) (0.020) (0.017) 
Mixed 0.097** 0.053* -0.027** 0.143** 0.099** 0.067** -0.024** 0.148** 
 (0.015) (0.023) (0.007) (0.007) (0.015) (0.022) (0.007) (0.008) 
Private 0.100** 0.100** -0.024** 0.159** 0.101** 0.110** -0.021** 0.166** 
 (0.014) (0.018) (0.008) (0.008) (0.014) (0.017) (0.008) (0.008) 
SFor(=Startup*Foreign) -0.057** 0.075* -0.182** -0.224** -0.047* 0.059 -0.213** -0.279** 
 (0.022) (0.030) (0.025) (0.016) (0.022) (0.036) (0.014) (0.021) 
SMix(=Startup*Mixed) 0.100** 0.012 -0.039* -0.135** -0.124** -0.109 -0.144** -0.211** 
 (0.038) (0.040) (0.015) (0.037) (0.036) (0.062) (0.043) (0.064) 
SPri (=Startup*Private) 0.039** 0.419** 0.016 0.080** 0.130 0.183 -0.114** -0.127** 
 (0.012) (0.071) (0.014) (0.020) (0.067) (0.117) (0.029) (0.041) 
SSta(=Startup*State) -0.024 0.111** -0.177** 0.066** 0.047* 0.065* -0.084** -0.067 
 (0.016) (0.022) (0.011) (0.018) (0.019) (0.033) (0.030) (0.040) 
SFor(=Startup*Foreign)*year     0.025 -0.002 0.024** 0.047** 
     (0.013) (0.022) (0.006) (0.008) 
SMix(=Startup*Mixed)*year     -0.010 0.063* 0.022** 0.054** 
     (0.017) (0.028) (0.007) (0.009) 
SPri (=Startup*Private)*year     -0.005 0.013 0.024** 0.031** 
     (0.005) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008) 
SSta(=Startup*State)   *year     0.021* 0.040** -0.014 0.019 
     (0.009) (0.014) (0.012) (0.016) 
No. of obs. 19,971 19,971  153,402 153,402  19,971 19,971  153,402 153,402 
No. of firms 4,657 4,657  26,286 26,286  4,657 4,657  26,286 26,286 
R2 0.742  0.670  0.755  0.681  
P-values:          
Foreign+ SFor = Private+SPri 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000     
Foreign+ SFor = Mixed+SMix 0.170 0.219 0.000 0.000     
Foreign+ SFor = 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000     
Private + SPri  = Mixed+SMix 0.145 0.000 0.005 0.282     
Private + SPri = 0 0.000 0.000 0.611 0.000     
Mixed  + SMix = 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000     
 
Notes:  Standard errors are in parentheses (robust in OLS); * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.  The omitted category is state ownership.  The estimates are 
obtained from the translog function, given by equation (1), which included industry dummies, year dummies, and controls for data anomalies.  Startup=1 if firm is a 




Table 6: Marginal Effect of Domestic Firm Efficiency and Industry Competition on the 
Probability of Acquisition by Foreign Investors, 1993-2000 
 
 Czech Republic  Russia 
 dF/dX dF/dX  dF/dX dF/dX  
Et-1 (Efficiency) 0.750** 0.734** 0.047**  0.039** 
 (0.087) (0.096) (0.010) (0.009) 
Mixedt-1 1.634 0.936 -0.193** -0.205**  
 (1.872) (1.794) (0.047) (0.069) 
Privatet-1 2.030** 1.512** -0.114* -0.125 
 (0.509) (0.575) (0.052) (0.069) 
Mixedt-1* Time -0.297 -0.122 0.080** 0.079** 
 (0.177) (0.211) (0.013) (0.017) 
Privatet-1* Time -0.351** -0.175 0.058** 0.058** 
 (0.113) (0.138) (0.013) (0.018) 
Time 0.606** 0.335 -0.004 -0.008 
 (0.097) (0.125) (0.010) (0.006) 
lnKt-1 0.548** 0.537 0.085** 0.014 
 (0.060) (0.068) (0.006) (0.026) 
Herfindahl Index t-1 --   -0.049**  -- -0.008 
    (0.009)   (0.006) 
No. of obs. 14,424  122,182 
Pseudo R2 0.111 0.157  0.146 0.168 
Unconditional probability (%) 2.121  0.407 
 
Notes:  The reported marginal effects (multiplied by 100) are obtained from probit estimates.  The dependent 
variable is a dummy indicating whether a formerly domestic firm is acquired by foreign investors.  Standard errors 
(multiplied by 100) are in parentheses; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.  The omitted category is state 
ownership lagged one year.  The firm-specific measure of efficiency (E) is obtained from the standardized residuals 
of the translog function estimated for each year separately, with industry dummies and controls for data anomalies 
included.  Time is calendar time, starting with 1 in 1993.  Regional dummies (for Russia) and industry dummies are 
included in the probit estimates but not shown here.  
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Table 7: Time-Varying Effects of Ownership on Efficiency,  
1992-2000 
 Czech Republic 
 QREG RE 2SLS-RE 
Foreign 0.280** 0.149** 0.208** 
 (0.031) (0.025) (0.046) 
Mixed 0.002  0.009  0.003 
 (0.037) (0.023) (0.063) 
Private 0.142** 0.089** 0.103** 
 (0.023) (0.018) (0.029) 
τ * Foreign 0.006  0.018** 0.033** 
 (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) 
τ * Mixed -0.013 -0.003 0.020* 
 (0.010) (0.006) (0.010) 
τ * Private -0.038** -0.031** -0.012* 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
τ * State -0.017** -0.016** -0.001 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) 
No. of obs. 19,971 19,971 15,142 
No. of firms 4,657 4,657 3,781 
R2 0.528 0.744 0.754 
Russia 
 QREG RE 2SLS-RE 
Foreign 0.616** 0.296** 0.465** 
 (0.029) (0.025) (0.132) 
Mixed 0.373** 0.134** -0.012 
 (0.014) (0.012) (0.144) 
Private 0.383** 0.124** 0.006 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.122) 
τ * Foreign 0.152** 0.080** 0.060** 
 (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) 
τ * Mixed -0.016** -0.023** -0.014** 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.005) 
τ * Private -0.013** -0.022** -0.019** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
τ * State 0.021** 0.014** 0.002 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.011) 
No. of obs. 153,402 153,402 140,658 
No. of firms 26,286 26,286 24,595 
R2 0.484 0.672 0.689 
 
Notes:  Coefficients = estimated log joint effects of different types of ownership relative to state 
ownership. Standard errors are in parentheses (robust in OLS); * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.  
The estimates are obtained from the translog function specified in equation (1) and which includes 
industry dummies, year dummies, and controls for data anomalies.  τ is the time since the change in the 
corresponding ownership status.  QREG – median regression, RE – random effects estimator, 2SLS-RE – 
two stage least squares random effect estimator. The 2SLS-RE estimator uses exogenous information on 
ministries under central planning as instruments for endogenous variables. 
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 Table 8: Average Annual Transition Probabilities of Existing Firm Moving Across 
Efficiency Groups by Ownership Type, 1992-2000 
 
Czech Republic  Russia 
Foreign  
 Bottom Middle Top Exit   Bottom Middle Top Exit 
Bottom 0.782 0.146 0.049 0.023  Bottom 0.504 0.180 0.132 0.185 
Middle 0.147 0.648 0.199 0.006  Middle 0.146 0.449 0.327 0.079 
Top 0.018 0.137 0.833 0.012  Top 0.028 0.088 0.823 0.062 
Mixed 
 Bottom Middle Top Exit   Bottom Middle Top Exit 
Bottom 0.782 0.179 0.021 0.018   Bottom 0.694 0.163 0.022 0.121 
Middle 0.191 0.685 0.115 0.010   Middle 0.180 0.596 0.168 0.056 
Top 0.025 0.233 0.735 0.007   Top 0.036 0.187 0.718 0.059 
Private 
 Bottom Middle Top Exit   Bottom Middle Top Exit 
Bottom 0.801 0.151 0.018 0.031   Bottom 0.659 0.167 0.023 0.152 
Middle 0.223 0.625 0.130 0.022   Middle 0.182 0.578 0.166 0.074 
Top 0.019 0.199 0.755 0.027   Top 0.037 0.192 0.695 0.076 
State 
 Bottom Middle Top Exit   Bottom Middle Top Exit 
Bottom 0.679 0.192 0.056 0.073  Bottom 0.708 0.177 0.020 0.095 
Middle 0.233 0.572 0.147 0.048  Middle 0.198 0.562 0.188 0.052 
Top 0.042 0.247 0.662 0.050  Top 0.035 0.199 0.711 0.055 
 
Notes:  The average annual probabilities are based on a firm-specific measure of efficiency (E) obtained from the 
standardized residuals of the translog function estimated for each year separately (1992-2000), with industry dummies 
and controls for data anomalies included.  Based on its individual E measure, a firm is then categorized each year by 
where it falls in the distribution of E’s: bottom, middle or top third.  All transition probabilities are statistically 
significant at 5% level (using bootstrapped standard errors), except for a middle-to-exit flow of foreign firms and a top-
to-exit flow of firms with mixed ownership in the Czech Republic.  
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Table 9:  Parameters of Conditional (β) Convergence by Firm Ownership 
 
 Czech Republic Russia 
 OLS IV OLS IV 
Ownership=Foreign 0.106*** 0.226*** 0.340*** 0.397*** 
 (0.020) (0.083) (0.030) (0.118) 
Ownership=Mixed 0.013 0.143* -0.006 -0.023 
 (0.021) (0.076) (0.008) (0.014) 
Ownership=Private 0.004 0.098 0.003 -0.006 
 (0.016) (0.074) (0.007) (0.014) 
EfficiencyP-1 0.869*** 0.604* 0.862*** 0.983*** 
 (0.033) (0.365) (0.015) (0.060) 
EfficiencyP-1*Foreign  0.017 0.222 -0.084*** -0.287* 
 (0.037) (0.361) (0.028) (0.163) 
EfficiencyP-1*Mixed -0.091 0.159 0.018 -0.074 
 (0.062) (0.364) (0.019) (0.059) 
EfficiencyP-1*Private 0.028 0.298 0.024 -0.042 
 (0.035) (0.371) (0.018) (0.062) 
No. of obs. 7344 1952 65208 24226 
R2 0.696 0.748 0.598 0.631 
 
Notes:  Robust standard errors in parentheses;  * significant at 10%; **  significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
Dependent variable is firm specific (random effect) efficiency estimated on the 2-year panels.  Industry and period 
dummies are included.  The omitted category is state ownership.  The difference between the third and second lags 
of the efficiency level is used as an instrument following Arellano and Bover (1995). 
 39
Figure 1: Quantile Estimates of Relative Ownership Effects on Efficiency by Period 
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Table A1:  Construction of the Sample of Firms, 1992-2000 
 
  1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Czech Sample          
Initial number of firms1 2416 3559 4379 2385 2357 9136 22949 22201 19282
Small firms2 454 939 1364 19 16 4791 16688 13294 12064
Non-industrial firms3 0 0 0 2 0 0 2634 4721 3260
Firms with missing 
observations4 425 470 45 47 58 2159 1447 1922 1874
Final sample (no. of firms) 1537 2159 2970 2317 2283 2186 2180 2264 2084
    
Russian Sample          
Initial number of firms1 25824 25633 27983 29053 28607 28601 29139 29153 29252
Small firms2 7739 6769 7785 8213 8989 9250 10689 10938 11343
Non-industrial firms3 872 514 754 970 891 895 963 945 940
Firms with missing 
    observations4 580 427 629 661 1589 1768 1404 1392 1934
Final sample (no. of firms) 16633 17923 18815 19209 17138 16688 16083 15878 15035
 
Notes:  
1 The annual number of firms for the Czech Republic in 1992 and for the entire Russian sample for 1985-2000 are 
constructed from the total number of firms at the end of the year, whereas in the Czech 1993-2000 sample they are 
constructed from quarterly observations. Source: Czech Statistical Office and Goskomstat. 
2 Firms with less than 100 employees in all years or which have missing values for number employed in all years. 
3 Firms with a non-industrial or unidentified ISIC classification in all years; 5-digit industry codes (OKONKh) for 
Russian firms were reclassified into new 2-digit ISIC categories. 
4 Missing values and inconsistencies in other key variables: ownership, output and fixed assets. 
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Table A2:  Description of Variables 
 
Variable Czech Data Russian Data 
Revenue 1992: Value of production in current 
prices of enterprises;                                   
1993-2000 Revenue from own 
production and services plus change in 
inventory (without  taxes); 
 
Volume of production in current prices 
of enterprises (without taxes) 
Capital 1992: equity  
1993-2000: tangible and intangible 
assets 
Average value of fixed productive assets 
used in industrial production in a given 
year. 
 
Labor Average number of fulltime-equivalent 
employees, adjusted on the basis of an 
eight hour day. 
Average number of industrial employees 
in a given year -- an adjustment is made 
for contracted part-time workers.  All 
others are considered as one. 
 
Ownership Available for 1991-2000. 
Defined as more than 50% ownership:       
1. Private - includes private local firms, 
individuals, cooperatives, and NGOs;  
2. State - includes federal and municipal 
ownership; 
3. Mixed - combination of any types of 
ownership with no one category having 
50%;  
4. Foreign  
Available for 1993-2000. 
Defined as 100% ownership:                      
1. Private - includes private local firms, 
cooperatives, and NGOs; 
2. State - includes federal, regional and 
municipal ownership;  
3. Mixed - combination of any domestic 
types of ownership  
4. Foreign -- including partial ownership 
 
Startup =1 when a firm appears in the registry 
for the first time 
 
=1 when a firm appears in the registry 
for the first time 
 
Industry - Old 
Classification 
 
3-digit old industry codes are recoded 
into 2-digit ISIC 
5-digit OKONH (Russian Classification 
of Industries of the National Economy) 
is recoded into 2-digit ISIC 
Industry - New 
Classification 
2-digit NACE (some years up to 6-digit) 
is recoded into 2-digit ISIC 
 
5-digit OKONH is recoded into 2-digit 
ISIC 
Ministry Available for 1990-1993. 
4-digit ministry codes are recoded into 8 
ministry categories 
Available for 1985-1995. 
4-digit ministry codes are recoded into 
37 ministry categories 
We also use several variables to control for other features of our data and major events. We have for instance 
included dummy variables for outlier observations of a change in capital stock relative to corresponding changes in 
output or in employment. .For Russia, we have also included two additional variables: i) an interaction term between 
a dummy for year 1992 and state ownership and ii) an interaction term between a dummy for year 1992 and the log 
of capital.  The former variable is added because ownership information is not available in 1992 and like others we 
assume state ownership for all firms in this year, given that large-scale privatization in Russia started only at the end 
of 1992.  The latter variable is included in Russia because 1992 was the first year of high inflation and the end-year 




Table A3: OLS coefficients on Ownership and Herfindahl Index (HHI) by 2-Digit ISIC: Czech Republic 
  
Industry ISIC N HHI Foreign Mixed Private 
  Foreign Total  Coef SE. Coef SE. Coef SE. 
Recycling 37 14 125 1431 0.020 0.566 -0.187 0.326 0.687 0.246 
Manufacture of textiles 17 154 1188 214 0.087 0.076 -0.062 0.067 -0.029 0.052 
Manufacture of electrical machinery and apparatus  31 309 1012 293 0.158 0.085 -0.028 0.106 0.042 0.089 
Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products 26 246 1247 277 0.166 0.053 0.013 0.053 0.113 0.043 
Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products 24 95 561 687 0.195 0.094 -0.002 0.096 0.076 0.074 
Manufacture of medical.precision and optical 
instruments. watches and clocks 33 81 469 528 0.202 0.122 -0.160 0.123 -0.071 0.111 
Manufacture of wearing apparel; dressing and dyeing of 
fur 18 114 607 946 0.226 0.093 0.255 0.090 -0.001 0.073 
Tanning and dressing of leather; manufacture of 
luggage, handbags, saddlery, harness and footwear 19 52 460 729 0.352 0.128 0.283 0.146 0.233 0.086 
Manufacture of other transport equipment 35 27 411 634 0.361 0.097 0.101 0.095 0.150 0.079 
Manufacture of machinery and equipment NEC (not 
elsewhere classified) 29 269 2756 117 0.408 0.043 0.130 0.034 0.128 0.029 
Manufacture of wood and of products of wood and cork, 
except furniture; manufacture of articles of straw and 
plaiting materials 20 86 599 398 0.425 0.100 0.156 0.100 0.110 0.077 
Publishing. printing and reproduction of recorded media 22 95 537 359 0.427 0.095 -0.001 0.106 0.145 0.082 
Manufacture of food products and beverages 15 252 2988 127 0.446 0.053 0.102 0.050 0.221 0.041 
Manufacture of rubber and plastic products 25 151 615 717 0.463 0.088 0.176 0.127 0.152 0.069 
Manufacture of paper and paper products 21 74 378 764 0.477 0.096 0.171 0.096 0.012 0.098 
Manufacture of furniture; manufacturing NEC 36 134 1211 481 0.534 0.078 -0.034 0.065 -0.011 0.044 
Electricity. gas steam and hot-water supply 40 62 634 685 0.566 0.127 0.387 0.119 0.283 0.091 
Manufacture of fabricated metal products. except 
machinery and equipment 28 263 2043 215 0.617 0.058 0.063 0.059 0.155 0.041 
Manufacture of radio, television and communication 
equipment and apparatus 32 71 332 850 0.630 0.179 0.330 0.143 0.234 0.132 
Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 34 171 528 3516 0.652 0.096 -0.004 0.097 0.062 0.091 
Manufacture of basic metals 27 67 682 1086 0.654 0.108 0.513 0.113 0.214 0.100 
Mining of uranium and thorium ores 12 40 264 548 0.891 0.363 0.950 0.329 0.828 0.313 
Manufacture of office. accounting and computing 
machinery 30 14 44 3900 1.131 0.816 1.019 0.734 1.026 0.575 
Mining of coal and lignite; extraction of peat 10 10 131 2333 1.136 0.449 0.838 0.392 0.797 0.318 




Table A4: OLS coefficients on Ownership and Herfindahl Index (HHI) by 3-Digit ISIC: Russia 
  
Industry ISIC N HHI Foreign Mixed Private 
  Foreign Total  Coef SE. Coef SE. Coef SE. 
Manufacture of tobacco products 160 82 261 849 -0.011 0.361 0.127 0.342 0.069 0.336 
Production, transmission and distribution of electricity 401 49 3937 165 0.058 0.198 -0.656 0.104 0.272 0.082 
Manufacture of motor vehicles 341 68 1313 1578 0.308 0.147 -0.026 0.090 -0.047 0.090 
Manufacture of products of wood, cork, straw 
 and plaiting materials 202 165 3348 154 0.461 0.115 -0.227 0.053 -0.140 0.054 
Manufacture of beverages 155 289 4820 116 0.484 0.088 -0.012 0.035 -0.093 0.039 
Manufacture of non-metallic mineral products n.e.c. 269 145 16619 40 0.504 0.109 0.000 0.020 -0.021 0.020 
Mining of non-ferrous metal ores, except uranium  
and thorium ores 132 40 869 756 0.627 0.330 0.032 0.124 0.541 0.140 
Manufacture of special-purpose machinery 292 194 8969 107 0.635 0.095 0.076 0.028 0.110 0.030 
Recycling of metal waste and scrap 371 66 728 621 0.669 0.178 -0.068 0.118 -0.046 0.120 
Sawmilling and planing of wood 201 626 12891 71 0.686 0.052 0.132 0.019 0.251 0.023 
Manufacture of insulated wire and cable 313 45 377 668 0.750 0.294 0.056 0.240 0.311 0.217 
Manufacture of general-purpose machinery 291 124 2666 172 0.750 0.117 0.102 0.057 0.128 0.061 
Manufacture of basic chemicals 241 87 1175 297 0.770 0.175 0.260 0.102 0.645 0.112 
Manufacture of medical appliances and instruments 331 64 1899 190 0.775 0.135 0.027 0.044 0.172 0.059 
Manufacture of domestic appliances n.e.c. 293 63 1497 1499 0.819 0.144 -0.038 0.071 -0.140 0.058 
Manufacture of paper and paper products 210 109 1387 420 0.821 0.143 0.177 0.095 0.117 0.093 
Manufacture of basic precious and non-ferrous metals 272 77 626 1046 0.829 0.201 -0.020 0.180 0.129 0.194 
Manufacture of basic iron and steel 271 65 1108 699 0.839 0.214 0.371 0.149 0.433 0.152 
Growing of cereals and other crops n.e.c. 111 289 988 524 0.888 0.123 -0.106 0.112 0.137 0.164 
Manufacture of plastics products 252 76 927 1590 0.910 0.202 0.291 0.121 0.224 0.127 
Manufacture of furniture 361 110 3890 194 0.926 0.151 -0.003 0.047 0.116 0.047 
Manufacture of structural metal products, tanks,  
reservoirs and steam generators 281 56 2113 964 0.952 0.184 0.150 0.077 0.182 0.076 
Manufacture of footwear 192 151 2315 240 0.976 0.101 0.332 0.066 0.391 0.066 
Spinning, weaving and finishing of textiles 171 28 3684 86 1.016 0.274 0.390 0.062 0.546 0.067 
Manufacture of other food products 154 130 12567 59 1.048 0.147 0.000 0.017 -0.098 0.017 
Manufacture of other chemical products 242 137 2488 192 1.049 0.111 0.439 0.052 0.482 0.053 
Manufacture of electric motors, generators and 
transformers 311 43 2549 181 1.074 0.181 0.312 0.055 0.049 0.054 
Manufacture of wearing apparel, except fur apparel 181 151 8483 127 1.155 0.109 0.271 0.032 0.341 0.031 
Dressing and dyeing of fur; manufacture of fur 182 33 458 1526 1.167 0.314 0.885 0.219 1.022 0.215 
Production, processing and preservation of meat, fish, 
fruit, vegetables, oils and fats 151 248 9263 98 1.224 0.088 0.291 0.040 0.316 0.040 
Publishing 221 45 2262 1862 1.274 0.248 0.197 0.049 0.089 0.050 
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Manufacture of refined petroleum products 232 114 952 419 1.289 0.170 0.916 0.115 1.071 0.140 
Manufacture of television and radio receivers,  
sound or video recording or reproducing apparatus,  
and associated goods 323 46 524 586 1.553 0.298 -0.066 0.092 0.106 0.125 
Manufacture of other fabricated metal products;  
metalworking service activities 289 68 3369 205 1.594 0.211 0.057 0.057 0.052 0.060 
Manufacture of office, accounting and computing 
machinery 300 40 237 1511 1.602 0.336 0.352 0.154 0.366 0.206 
Manufacturing n.e.c. 369 137 2606 961 2.007 0.151 0.292 0.070 0.076 0.063 
 
 45
Table A5: Changes over Time in the Efficiency Gains of Foreign Firms Relative to  
Other Types of Ownership  
Czech Republic 
 
Percentile Foreign-Mixed Foreign-Private Foreign-State 
 95/97-94/92 98/00-95/97 95/97-94/92 98/00-95/97 95/97-94/92 98/00-95/97 
0.071 0.019 -0.021 0.01 -0.051 0.023 RE (0.078) (0.069) (0.059) (0.070) (0.051) (0.051) 
0.153 0.108 -0.003 -0.004 -0.065 0.035 2SLS-RE (0.136) (0.113) (0.079) (0.109) (0.068) (0.082) 
Quantile       
0.200* -0.161** 0.038 -0.029 0.160** 0.269** 10 (0.090) (0.048) (0.056) (0.040) (0.004) (0.004) 
0.240** -0.035 0.043 0.001 0.147** 0.018** 50 (0.075) (0.042) (0.045) (0.032) (0.002) (0.003) 
0.195) 0.018 0.052 -0.049 0.081** -0.023** 90 




Percentile Foreign-Mixed Foreign-Private Foreign-State 
 95/97-94/92 98/00-95/97 95/97-94/92 98/00-95/97 95/97-94/92 98/00-95/97 
0.121** 0.021 0.142** -0.047 0.253** 0.040 RE (0.057) (0.053) (0.057) (0.054) (0.054) (0.047) 
0.106 0.315** 0.059 0.230** 0.213** 0.238** 2SLS-RE (0.134) (0.085) (0.112) (0.084) (0.091) (0.073) 
Quantile       
0.426** 0.195** 0.346** 0.167** 0.383** 0.100** 10 (0.072) (0.063) (0.073) (0.063) (0.005) (0.005) 
0.370** 0.129** 0.318** 0.108** 0.395** 0.130** 50 (0.044) (0.034) (0.044) (0.034) (0.002) (0.001) 
0.269** -0.082 0.282** -0.150** 0.348** -0.031** 90 
(0.059) (0.043) (0.060) (0.043) (0.004) (0.002) 
 
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses are computed by the Delta method (Greene, 2003); * significant at 5%; ** 
significant at 1%.  All coefficients are significant at 5%, except two: last column first and last rows for Russia.  The 
estimates of the coefficients and covariance matrices are obtained from the Chow quantile regressions of output on 
capital and labor inputs (translog specification), ownership dummies, industry dummies, and controls for data 
anomalies. 
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Figure A1:  Random Effect Estimates of Ownership Effects on Efficiency by Sub-Periods 
     Czech Republic     Russia 
  
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
  foreign  Private  mixed  State  
 47
 
